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  Speaking Truth to Power: The Effect of Candid Feedback on How Individuals with Power 
Allocate Resources 
 
Abstract. Subordinates are often seen as impotent, able to react to but not affect how 
powerholders treat them. Instead, we conceptualize subordinate feedback as an important trigger 
of powerholders’ behavioral self-regulation, and explore subordinates’ reciprocal influence on 
how powerholders allocate resources to them over time. In two experiments using a multi-party, 
multi-round dictator game paradigm, we find that when subordinates provided candid feedback 
about whether they found prior allocations to be fair or unfair, powerholders regulated how self-
interested their allocations were over time. However, when subordinates provided compliant 
feedback about powerholders’ prior allocation decisions (offered consistently positive feedback, 
regardless of the powerholders’ prior allocation), those powerholders made increasingly self-
interested allocations over time. In addition, we show that guilt partially mediates this 
relationship: powerholders feel more guilty after receiving negative feedback about an allocation, 
subsequently leading to a less self-interested allocation, while they feel less guilty after receiving 
positive feedback about an allocation, subsequently taking more for themselves. Our findings 
integrate the literature on upward feedback with theory about moral self-regulation to support the 
idea that subordinates are an important source of influence over those who hold power over them.  
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Speaking Truth to Power: The Effect of Candid Feedback on How Individuals with Power 
Allocate Resources 
Organizations and groups regularly face the challenge of how to distribute finite resources 
(March & Simon, 1958), including compensation, plum assignments, budgets, expense accounts, 
and even office space (Barnard, 1938). In these contexts, some individuals have control over 
how these resources are allocated, while other have to accept the allocations made to them. As a 
result, those who control resource allocations have a great deal of power. In fact, most 
definitions of power focus on the extent to which an individual controls important outcomes or 
resources (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003) or the extent to which others depend on them for valued resources (Emerson, 
1962; French & Raven, 1959).  
However, allocating finite resources involves difficult tradeoffs for the individual with the 
power to do so, not only about how to divide them, but also about how to balance his or her own 
self-interest with the interests of those over whom they have power (Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, 
& Bazerman, 1997; Komorita & Parks, 1994). Every allocation requires the individual with 
power to make a choice about whether to serve the interests of the group or to maximize their 
own self-interest, typically at the expense of others (Rus, van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2010). 
How those in power resolve tradeoffs between their own and others’ interests when allocating 
resources is thus a topic of significant importance in the power (e.g., DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, 
& Ceranic, 2012; Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006) and organizational justice literatures (e.g., 
Adams, 1965; Leventhal, 1980; Tyler, 1989) as well as in research on moral and pro-social 
behavior (Bersoff, 1999; Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006).  
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A considerable amount of the research on power would lead to pessimistic conclusions 
about how individuals resolve these tradeoffs. Power appears to increase individuals’ tendencies 
to take more for themselves, and feel legitimate in doing so (e.g., De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; 
De Cremer, van Dijk, & Folmer, 2009; Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972; Piff, Kraus, Côté, 
Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006; Winter, 1973). Fortunately, there is also 
evidence to suggest that some contextual factors, such as the extent to which the situation 
facilitates powerholders’ thinking about their social responsibility to others, can moderate these 
tendencies (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Handgraaf, van Dijk, 
Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2001).  
Interestingly, one contextual factor that may rein in powerholders’ tendency to take more 
for themselves when making allocations has been neglected: the behavior of those affected by 
the allocation decisions (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, & De Cremer, 2003). Work on how power affects 
allocation behavior overwhelmingly focuses on the unidirectional effect of powerholders on 
those receiving the allocations. This treats the exercise of power as a one-way street, and 
assumes that powerholders are unaffected by the outcomes of their decisions. It also treats 
everyone on the receiving end of an allocation as impotent and incapable of shaping his or her 
outcomes. As Handgraaf and his colleagues note, a “strong bias exists towards research and 
theorizing about allocators, [and] recipients are usually mentioned only as some kind of 
afterthought and are often not elaborated upon extensively” (2003, p. 279). In their words, this 
gap represents a “missed opportunity” (2003, p. 279).  
In this paper, we address this missed opportunity and examine the influence that recipients 
of a powerholder’s allocations can have over the allocations they receive over time. (We will 
refer to these recipients as “subordinates”, as they are subordinate to the powerholder making the 
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allocation). We argue that when subordinates’ feedback is candid (i.e., when it accurately reflects 
the extent to which the powerholders’ last allocation was self-interested), it can trigger 
powerholders’ self-regulatory processes and function as an important check on their self-
interested behavior over time. We compare this type of feedback to compliant feedback (i.e., 
consistently positive feedback about the powerholder’s last allocation, regardless of how self-
interested it was), which provides no countervailing check against increasing self-interest over 
time. Specifically, we link research on moral self-regulation to existing theories of power to 
explain changes in the pattern and trend of powerholders’ behavior as a function of subordinates’ 
feedback to them.  
We integrate knowledge about upward feedback processes and outcomes in organizations 
(Antonioni, 1994; Seifert & Yukl, 2010; Seifert, Yukl, & McDonald, 2003; Smither, London & 
Reilly, 2005) with psychological theory on moral self-regulation (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Monin 
& Miller, 2001) to conceptualize subordinates as an important source of social information for 
those in positions of power. In doing so, we explore the ways in which those subject to powerful 
others can have a more profound influence over their ultimate outcomes than current 
understandings in the power literature include (Handgraaf et al., 2003). In addition, we explore 
the role of emotion as a mechanism driving our effects. We show that the level of guilt triggered 
by subordinates’ feedback as a function of the powerholder’s last allocation operates as a 
mechanism that either dampens (if guilt is high) or amplifies (if guilt is low) powerholders’ self-
interested tendencies over time. 
Importantly, we examine allocation decisions as part of an ongoing dynamic that unfolds 
between those making the allocations and those receiving them (Bluedorn & Jaussi, 2008; 
Shamir, 2011). This approach adds an important dimension to our research, since the majority of 
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studies about how power affects allocation decisions focus on one-shot contexts and ignore the 
temporal nature of most organizational decision-making (Zaheer, Albert, & Zaheer, 1999). 
Attending to the temporal dimension in this process allows us to understand the behavior of 
those with power as part of a continuing reciprocal relationship: powerholders act, those 
subordinate to them and affected by their decisions react, leading to subsequent reactions by the 
powerholder which may (or may not) reflect an adjustment in their behavior as a result of the 
subordinates’ reaction (and so on). Even work that has looked at allocation decisions across 
multiple rounds has focused on overall (cross-time) averages or final round allocations as the 
ultimate outcomes of interest (e.g., Lurie & Swaminathan, 2009). In contrast, we offer a richer 
understanding of this reciprocal dynamic, and examine changes in the patterns and trends of 
behavior in addition to averages and overall outcomes (Menard, 2002).  
Power, Self-Interest, and Self-Regulatory Restraint 
Historically, power has been considered a corrupting force (Kipnis, 1972) that encourages 
individuals to pursue their own self-interest (De Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & van Dijk, 
2005; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). Individuals with more power feel less inhibited about doing 
what they want (Keltner et al., 2003), are inclined to behave less generously towards others (Piff 
et al., 2010), feel more entitled to take resources for themselves (De Cremer et al., 2009; De 
Cremer & van Dijk, 2005), and experience less interference from others when they do so (Winter, 
1973).  
There are three main reasons why having power will motivate higher levels of self-
interested decision making. First, given their control over critical resources, individuals with 
power tend to perceive themselves as highly independent (Lee & Tiedens, 2001) and socially 
distant from others (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013). Social 
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distance consequently increases self-interested tendencies in resource allocations (Bohnet & Frey, 
1999; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996), and can exacerbate self-interested behavior more 
generally (Messick & Sentis, 1983).  
Second, powerholders pay more attention to information relevant to their self-interest 
(Copeland, 1994; Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998). Individuals in positions of power over others 
perceive that they have more input in a group and thus deserve more of the common resource in 
return (Diekmann et al., 1997). They thus underestimate their own levels of self-interested 
behavior (Messick & Sentis, 1979; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) and may not see violations 
of equality or equity norms as necessarily self-interested (Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988; 
Wicklund, 1975). 
Third, research on cognitive role schemas has shown that powerholders may be 
particularly likely to deceive themselves into thinking that self-interested allocation decisions are 
appropriate, particularly in the presence of incentives to behave in a self-interested manner (e.g., 
De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; Messick & Sentis, 1983). For instance, powerholders will deviate 
from an equality (or equity) norm and take more than their fair share from a common resource, 
even when they have done no more work than any of the other group members, simply by virtue 
of being named the “leader” or “supervisor” of a group (De Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & 
van Dijk, 2005). Even if their power was randomly assigned to them, the simple act of being 
assigned that power leads people to feel entitled to behave in a self-interested manner (De 
Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006).  
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that this general tendency for powerholders to 
take more will escalate over time, as individuals with power become accustomed to getting their 
own way and few people challenge their actions (Kipnis, 1972; Winter, 1973). Together, these 
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psychological tendencies converge to a general conclusion that individuals with power will tend 
to take more for themselves, a tendency that will worsen over time. 
However, powerholders do not always make self-interested choices (Chen et al., 2001; 
Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Handgraaf et al., 2001). Like all individuals, those with power desire to 
see themselves as moral (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984) and are motivated to be seen as fair, 
generous and less self-interested by others (Franzen & Pointner, 2012). Even when they have the 
power to behave in a self-interested manner and get away with it, powerholders can be subject to 
self-regulatory restraints that curb this tendency (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1995).  
For instance, Dana and colleagues demonstrated how a deep-seated desire to appear 
moral helped mitigate powerholders’ self-interested tendencies in a dictator game (Dana et al., 
2006). In their experiment, a substantial number of participants in the dictator role chose to exit 
the game for a lower amount than they could have received otherwise, in order to prevent others 
from realizing how self-interested they were being (Dana et al., 2006). This natural restraint 
against being seen as self-interested exists in tension with the powerholder’s desire to maximize 
their own short-term self-interest. As powerholders seek to strike a balance between these 
opposing motivations, their subordinates have the opportunity to be a unique source of social 
influence to help tip the scales in either direction.  
The Role of Subordinate Feedback in Powerholders’ Allocation Decisions 
Certain contextual factors can influence powerful people to be more (rather than less) 
attentive to others’ interests as well as more willing to trade off their own self-interest and act in 
the interests of others (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Handgraaf et al., 2008; 
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Overbeck & Park, 2001). Here, we explore the role of subordinate feedback as a contextual 
factor influencing how self-interested powerholders will be over time.  
Though powerholders may be less susceptible to the influence of others than some 
(Keltner et al., 2003), they are not immune to it (e.g., Atwater, Roush, & Fischtal, 1995; Heslin 
& Latham, 2004; Reilly, Smither, & Vasiljopoulos, 1996; Walker & Smither, 1999). Research on 
upward feedback—that is, feedback from individuals lower in the hierarchy to those higher up—
suggests that it raises individuals’ self-awareness of what they do well or badly (Ashford & Tsui, 
1991; Atwater et al., 1995). Since subordinates are the immediate recipients of powerholders’ 
decisions, feedback from them has the potential to affect a powerholder’s positive or negative 
views about themselves.  
Candid versus compliant feedback. However, feedback from subordinates is unlikely to 
be consistent across sources (Cardy & Dobbins, 1994; Murphy & Cleveland, 1991). Indeed, 
work on upward influence (e.g., Wayne & Liden, 1995; Yukl & Tracey, 1992) and implicit voice 
theories (Detert & Edmondson, 2011) suggests that subordinates will differ in terms of their 
willingness to provide candid feedback to powerholders about how they are being treated. In 
particular, some subordinates will provide candid feedback about the decisions that affect them, 
while others will refrain from it, endorsing decisions that affect them regardless of whether those 
decisions have benefited or harmed them (Antonioni, 1994). We focus on this dimension here, 
and make a prediction about how subordinates who provide candid feedback to powerholders 
about their allocation decisions (i.e., oppose or endorse them depending on the level of their self-
interested behavior) rather than provide compliant feedback (i.e., endorse them unquestioningly) 
will elicit different behavior from their powerholders over time. 
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Subordinates who are candid with powerholders about their perceptions will provide 
negative feedback when allocations are perceived to be unfair, but will provide positive feedback 
when allocations are perceived positively. When subordinates are candid, those who have power 
over them will be more likely to make an effort to strike a balance between their own self-
interest and the interests of their followers. 
In contrast, subordinates who provide compliant feedback to powerholders regardless of 
their behavior (i.e., provide consistently positive feedback, regardless of the prior allocation) 
provide no countervailing source of information to motivate a change in self-perceptions, 
allowing powerholders to behave more selfishly. Specifically, we expect powerholders who 
receive compliant feedback to be less likely to make an effort to strike a balance between their 
own-interest and the interests of their subordinates. As such, we hypothesize the following as a 
general effect of subordinate feedback on how powerholders allocate resources to their 
subordinates: 
Hypothesis 1:  Powerholders who receive candid feedback about their allocation decisions 
make less self-interested allocations, on average, compared with powerholders who 
receive compliant feedback about their allocation decisions. 
However, our primary interest is in the effect of feedback on how powerholders manage 
the competing motivations to be more or less self-interested in an ongoing way. Thus, in order to 
unpack this general effect of subordinate feedback on allocations we require more specific 
hypothesizing about how different types of subordinate feedback (candid vs. compliant) will 
affect the trends and patterns of powerholders’ allocation decisions over time.  
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Effects of Subordinate Feedback on Powerholders’ Self-Regulatory Tendencies 
Research on multi-source feedback claims that it helps individuals perceive their behavior 
more accurately, especially when the feedback comes from someone with a different perspective 
(Seifert et al., 2003; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993). Although a number of studies argue that 
individuals in positions of power are more likely to change their behavior in the presence of 
negative feedback and less likely to change their behavior in the presence of positive feedback 
(e.g., Atwater et al., 1995; Hegarty, 1974; Walker & Smither, 1999), many others report either 
inconsistent or weak results for the overall impact of subordinate feedback (e.g., Atwater, 
Waldman, Atwater, & Cartier, 2000; Reilly et al., 1996; Seifert & Yukl, 2010). We argue that 
when powerholders are navigating competing motivations to be more or less self-interested, their 
subordinates’ feedback may swing their behavior in either direction, depending on whether it 
triggers their self-regulatory tendencies (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Monin & Miller, 2001). 
Individuals regulate their behavior in many domains, from what they eat to whether they 
sin (Vohs, 2006). Theories of moral credentialing and compensation (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 
2010; Monin & Jordan, 2009) argue that the moral self-concept is dynamic, and that we 
constantly navigate around an internal equilibrium that permits us to behave in a self-interested 
way, but only to the point at which our moral self-image would become unnecessarily tarnished 
by the behavior (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Individuals give themselves moral ‘credits’ for 
ethical behavior, which provide them with a license to behave unethically subsequently (Merritt 
et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). After building up their moral ‘bank account’ with ethical 
behaviors, individuals then draw on this account and feel licensed to commit self-interested or 
unethical acts (Batson & Shaw, 1991). However, individuals also accrue moral ‘debits’ for 
behaving unethically, for which they compensate by behaving more ethically subsequently 
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(Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). This moral compensation process is typically activated by the 
threat to the self-concept triggered by their prior unethical acts (Monin & Jordan, 2009).  
We expect that powerholders who receive candid feedback will engage in more active 
moral self-regulation than powerholders who receive compliant feedback. In other words, 
powerholders’ allocation decisions will fluctuate more over time for those with subordinates who 
provide candid feedback than for those with subordinates who provide compliant feedback. If 
powerholders receive negative feedback after a self-interested decision, it will threaten their 
ability to maintain a positive self-view (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Thompson & Loewenstein, 
1992), leading to subsequent compensation behavior (in this case, a less self-interested 
allocation). However, the less self-interested allocation will elicit a positive response from 
subordinates, which will then bolster their moral self-image and license the powerholder to make 
a more self-interested allocation. The ongoing self-regulation that candid feedback will trigger in 
powerholders means that, longitudinally, their decisions (or behavior) will follow neither a 
negative or positive trend. Instead, it will vary around some equilibrium point as powerholders 
adjust their next decision based on the most recent feedback.  
Hypothesis 2:  Candid feedback in response to a powerholder’s prior decision will predict 
how a powerholder’s allocation subsequently changes, such that after receiving positive 
(negative) feedback, their next allocation will be more (less) self-interested. 
In contrast, because powerholders with subordinates who provide compliant feedback are 
not confronted with negative feedback after self-interested decisions, their self-concept will be 
less threatened when they make those self-interested allocations, making compensation for this 
behavior less necessary. Instead, when powerholders receive compliant feedback from 
subordinates, they will maintain consistently positive self-views (Atwater et al., 1995). Without 
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the negative feedback that triggers moral self-regulation and keeps their motivation to behave in 
self-interested ways in check, we expect that powerholders with compliant feedback will slide 
more smoothly down a slippery slope towards increasingly self-interested behavior (Gino & 
Bazerman, 2009; Schrand & Zechman, 2011). In other words, we expect these powerholders to 
show a steadily escalating trend (significantly increasing slope) towards more self-interested 
allocations over time. 
Hypothesis 3: Powerholders who receive compliant feedback about their allocation 
decisions will make increasingly self-interested decisions over time. 
The Mediating Role of Guilt 
Thus far, our hypotheses have focused on how subordinate feedback shapes powerholders’ 
allocation behavior over time. We have not yet addressed what may be the underlying process 
behind our hypothesized effects. As such, a final goal of this paper is to unpack the mechanism 
that mediates the effect of subordinate feedback on powerholders’ allocation decisions. To do 
this, we return to theory on the moral self-concept (Monin & Jordan, 2009), as well as work on 
moral emotions (Eisenberg, 2000; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). As we have discussed 
already, morality is central to most people’s identities, and it is important that individuals are 
able to think of themselves as moral and fair (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Franzen & 
Pointner, 2012). The ability to view oneself as moral and fair is obviously compromised when 
one makes decisions that contravene moral norms. In allocation tasks, the most common norm 
used to determine fairness is equitable distribution (Leventhal, 1976). Thus, when individuals 
make self-interested allocations that are less than equitable, they are violating a moral norm.  
Transgressions of normative behavior are often accompanied by emotions (Blasi, 1999). 
While many emotions can follow from behavior that violates moral norms, one of the most 
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common is guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; McGraw, 1987). Guilt originates 
from interpersonal interactions (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Lewis, 2008; 
Tangney et al., 2007), and involves a negative evaluation of specific behaviors (Tangney et al., 
2007). Thus, feedback from those with whom one interacts will likely exacerbate guilt if that 
feedback is negative, or dampen guilt if that feedback is positive. In the context of allocating 
scarce resources, we expect that when powerholders receive more negative feedback from others 
they will feel more guilt, and when they receive more positive feedback from others they will 
feel less guilt. 
The question then becomes whether this emotional response to subordinate feedback 
changes powerholders’ allocation behavior, with higher levels of guilt predicting less self-
interested subsequent allocations and lower levels of guilt predicting more self-interested 
subsequent allocations. Existing research suggests that this will be the case. A key attribute of 
guilt is that it can motivate individuals to repair the damage caused by the action that triggered it. 
As Nelissen and Zeelenberg put it, “guilt motivates compensatory pro-social behavior to repair 
social bonds” (2009, p. 118). Both manipulated and self-reported guilt have been found to 
predict increases in cooperative behavior in social dilemmas (Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003; 
Nelissen, Dijker, & deVries, 2007). In addition, moral compensation theory (Monin & Jordan, 
2009) proposes that guilt constitutes a threat to a powerholder’s moral self-regard. Hence, if the 
self-interested nature of powerholders’ actions is highlighted for them by others, as negative 
feedback would do, they will feel more guilt and subsequently make a less self-interested 
decision in an attempt to repair their positive self-concept.  
Hypothesis 4: The guilt a powerholder feels after receiving feedback from subordinates 
about their most recent allocation will mediate the relationship between subordinates' 
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feedback and the change in the powerholder’s next allocation (i.e., whether it becomes 
more or less self-interested). 
Overview of Studies 
We are interested in the effect of candid (vs. compliant) subordinate feedback on the 
allocation behavior of powerholders over time, and whether guilt mediates the relationship 
between the type of subordinate feedback and subsequent changes in powerholders’ allocation 
behavior. To have precise empirical control over the independent variables in which we are 
interested, and to ensure these predictors drive the effects we hypothesize, in the two studies that 
follow we employ a multi-party, multi-round dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1986) to examine how dictators (powerholders) react to feedback from groups of recipients 
(subordinates). In Study 1, we investigate how different types of subordinate feedback about 
allocation decisions influence powerholders’ allocation decisions on average (Hypothesis 1) and 
over time (i.e., their patterns and trends) (Hypothesis 2 and 3). In Study 2, we replicate results 
for our first three hypotheses and explore the role of guilt as a mediator of the impact of 
subordinate feedback on powerholders’ allocation behavior (Hypothesis 4).  
The use of a multi-round dictator game provided a number of advantages in studying our 
research question. This paradigm allowed us to activate the tension between a powerholder’s 
motivations to make more or less self-interested decisions (e.g., Dana et al., 2006; for a review 
see Camerer, 2003), and to tap actual behavioral consequences of the subordinates’ feedback. 
The multi-round format further allowed us to examine trends over time in a nuanced way (e.g., 
Andrade & Ariely, 2009). Manipulating subordinates’ responses in real time as allocation 
decisions were being made allowed us to create groups of individuals that mapped our 
predictions precisely and to test the immediate effect of feedback on a powerholder’s actual 
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allocations (becoming more or less self-interested during each round). Finally, participants’ 
decisions had meaningful outcomes for them: powerholders who kept more of the common 
resource during the studies received more money or credit at the end of each study.  
Study 1 
Sample  
Eighty-six participants (50% female, Mage = 28.32 years, SD = 9.33, 48% currently 
employed) from a paid, community-based subject pool earned £10 for participating in the study, 
and could earn up to £10 more, depending on how much they kept of the common resource 
during the course of the experiment.  
Experimental Setting and Procedure 
Upon their arrival, participants were guided to cubicles containing a computer, a blank 
piece of paper and a set of instructions. All instructions were read aloud. Consistent with work 
on instant entitlement bias (e.g., De Cremer et al., 2009; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; van Dijk 
& De Cremer, 2006), participants were informed they would be assigned to either a 
‘powerholder’ (dictator) or a ‘subordinate’ (recipient) role. However, each participant was 
actually assigned the role of dictator, while a computer program modeled the reactions of the 
subordinates (we elaborate on this aspect of the procedure under “Measures and 
Operationalization”, below). Each group (consisting of 1 powerholder and 3 subordinates) was 
endowed with 100 points for each of 10 rounds. Participants were told that the powerholder’s 
task was to take as much of the resource as they desired, and the remaining resources would be 
divided equally among the three subordinates. They were also told that the identity of 
participants was anonymous, and that subordinates had no option but to accept the allocation of 
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powerholders. However, subordinates would provide feedback to the powerholder about their 
views of the fairness of the allocation decisions.  
Participants were told they would receive points amounting to a proportion of the total 
allocation over the ten rounds that they kept for themselves, and that these points would translate 
into higher earnings (up to an additional £10). During the debriefing, we checked whether 
participants understood the dynamics of the experiment and also probed them for suspicion. Six 
participants either failed to correctly reply to the questions designed to check whether they 
understood the game or reported suspicion that the subordinate feedback was fake. In addition, 
six participants failed to correctly answer three attention filters embedded in the questionnaire 
(i.e., “This is just to make sure you are reading this question carefully. Please select, ‘very likely’ 
below”). We excluded these participants from the analyses. 
Powerholders then allocated their initial endowment. After this and each subsequent 
round’s allocation, they received (programmed) subordinate feedback based on the extent to 
which the allocation decision of the powerholder in the previous round was assessed as more or 
less self-interested. At the end of all the rounds, the total points the powerholder retained for 
themselves, as well as the total points they had allocated to each of the “recipients” were 
calculated and recorded. We then debriefed the participants, and paid them their £10 base pay as 
well as an additional cash payout amounting to £0.01 for each point they had retained for 
themselves. These additional payouts ranged from £0 to £10 (M = £4.80, SD = £3.23).  
Conditions. The experiment had two conditions. In the candid feedback condition, all 
subordinates reacted candidly to powerholders’ allocations, more or less positively based on 
whether the powerholder was more or less equitable in the previous round. In the compliant 
feedback condition, all subordinates reacted in a consistently positive way to the powerholders’ 
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allocation decisions regardless of how self-interested they were. Subordinate feedback was 
modeled such that the individual feedback of the three computer-generated subordinates was 
reported to the powerholder as an average rating across all subordinates. This feedback was 
randomly generated around a fixed value that was dependent on the powerholder’s prior 
allocation (described below). 
Measures and Operationalization  
Classification of powerholders’ allocation behavior. To program subordinate feedback, 
the powerholder’s allocations had to be categorized such that the computer-generated 
subordinates responded appropriately after each round (the calculations used to ensure the 
feedback was realistic are available from the first author). Given that how powerholders resolve 
tradeoffs between their own and their subordinates’ interests when allocating resources is a key 
indicator of how fairly they treat their subordinates more generally (e.g., Bazerman, 
Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Lind, 2001) subordinate feedback to 
powerholders was framed in terms of “fairness”. We used equal division as the benchmark to 
determine whether powerholders’ allocation behavior was evaluated as fair or not by 
subordinates, based on prior work using dictator game paradigms (e.g., de Kwaadsteniet, 
Rijkhoff, & van Dijk, 2013).  
In the first round, an allocation of an equal or more than equal share (giving at least three-
fourths of the 100 point endowment to the three subordinates) was seen as a positive (fair) 
allocation, and an allocation of less than an equal share was seen as a negative (unfair) allocation. 
Our simulated subordinates responded to powerholders’ allocations on a round by round basis. 
After the first round, the allocation behavior of powerholders was classified by a combination of 
the amount they kept in that round and by the change in their behavior from the previous round. 
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Allocations of (1) an equal or more than equal share, with a positive change compared to the 
previous round were classified as “very positive”; (2) a less than an equal share, with a negative 
change compared to the previous round were classified as “very negative”; (3) a more than an 
equal share, but a negative change compared to the previous round were classified as “positive”; 
(4) and of a less than an equal share but with a positive change compared to the previous round 
were classified as “negative”. 
Subordinate feedback. Based on their prior round’s allocation, powerholders (our 
participants) received a rating of the fairness of their allocations as perceived by the (computer-
generated) recipients on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very unfair, 5 = very fair). In this experiment, 
powerholders saw the average rating across all group members (reported as a mean between 1 
and 5). To create realism, we used an algorithm that randomly varied the subordinate ratings in 
both subordinate feedback conditions around a fixed value based on how self-interestedly the 
powerholder behaved in the previous round. As an example, a powerholder in the candid 
feedback condition behaving negatively (that is, allocating a less than equal share to participants 
but nevertheless allocating more than they had in the previous round) would (as a function of the 
algorithm used by the program to create realism in the modeled subordinate feedback) receive 
ratings varied around a fixed value (between 2 and 3, labeled as “negative”) from his or her 
subordinates. In general, powerholders in the candid feedback condition received ratings above 3 
following their “positive” and “very positive” allocations, and ratings below 3 following their 
“negative” and “very negative” allocations. In contrast, powerholders in the compliant feedback 
condition received ratings around a fixed value (between 3 to 5) regardless of how self-
interestedly their previous round’s allocations had been. 
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Analytic strategy. We wanted to make use of the statistical power afforded by the 
multiple observations we had for each individual, while accounting for the fact that the 
observations (allocation decisions) were nested within individuals and thus were non-
independent. A random effects panel data approach allowed us to control for non-independence 
among the observations while utilizing all our data points, and also permitted an examination of 
trends and change over time (e.g., Liang, Farh, & Farh, 2012). We used a maximum-likelihood 
algorithm to derive parameter estimates with robust standard errors. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
To assess the effectiveness of the feedback manipulation, we asked a subsample of 
participants (54 participants) to indicate the extent to which they perceived the ratings of their 
subordinates to be negative (on a 7-point scale). A two-tailed t-test revealed that powerholders in 
candid feedback condition perceived the feedback they received as more negative than 
powerholders in compliant feedback condition, (Mcompliant feedback = 1.70, SD = 1.13 vs. Mcandid 
feedback = 5.37, SD = 1.64), t(53) = 9.53, p = .00.  
Hypothesis tests 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that on average, powerholders in the candid feedback condition 
take less of the common resource than powerholders in the compliant feedback condition. We 
ran a panel data regression, controlling for the first round allocation, and including a dummy 
variable for the subordinate feedback condition (compliant feedback = 0, candid feedback = 1). 
Consistent with our hypothesis and in line with findings in the upward feedback literature 
(Atwater et al., 1995; Hegarty, 1974; Walker & Smither, 1999), it revealed a negative and 
significant coefficient for condition (β = -.16, p = .036), indicating that powerholders in the 
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candid feedback condition (Mcandid feedback = 43.05, SD = 31.76) took significantly less on average 
than participants in the compliant feedback condition (Mcompliant feedback = 53.50, SD = 33.47).  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that candid subordinate feedback in response to a powerholder’s 
prior allocation decision would predict the change in a powerholder’s subsequent allocation 
decision. This is a hypothesis about the pattern of how self-interested a powerholder’s 
allocations become over time. Specifically, our prediction is that powerholders self-regulate their 
allocation decisions in the candid feedback condition (their allocations will fluctuate), but not in 
the compliant feedback condition, in which powerholders are not confronted with any negative 
feedback. This requires a test of the effect of subordinate feedback at time t-1 on the size of the 
change in the allocation of powerholders at time t, while controlling for non-independence 
among observations. A random effects panel data regression with feedback (t-1) as the 
independent variable provides an estimation of the effect of a given round’s feedback on the size 
of the change in the next round’s allocation, after parsing out the variance that can be attributed 
to time-invariant characteristics of the individual. Table 1 (Study 1) presents these results.  
The coefficient for feedback (t-1) was positive and significant for powerholders in the 
candid feedback condition (β = .34, p = .00, see Table 1, Study 1), showing that these 
powerholders significantly changed their allocations as a result of the candid feedback in the 
prior round. Moreover, this change was sensitive to the valence of the feedback they had 
received. Powerholders made less self-interested allocations (took less of the common resource) 
after being rated as unfair (less than 3, negative feedback about their prior allocation) in the 
previous round, and made more self-interested allocations (took more of the common resource) 
after being rated as fair (more than 3, positive feedback about their prior allocation) in the 
previous round. Specifically, after receiving negative feedback about their prior allocation, 
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participants allocated themselves an amount close to an equal share, while after receiving 
positive feedback about their prior allocation, participants allocated themselves more than half 
the total resources (Mnegative feedback = 31.72, SD = 15.10, vs. Mpositive feedback = 51.50, SD = 24.75, 
t(313) = 8.28, p = .00).  
In contrast, powerholders’ allocation decisions in the compliant feedback condition did 
not significantly change as a result of the subordinates’ feedback (β = -.01, ns). These results 
suggest that powerholders use candid feedback from subordinates to regulate their behavior, with 
positive feedback functioning as a license to increase their share of the common resource, and 
negative feedback triggering compensation for prior, more self-interested allocation behavior. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that powerholders in the candid feedback condition would become 
more self-interested over time. This is a hypothesis about the trend of how self-interested a 
powerholder’s allocations become over time. Specifically, our prediction is that the overall slope 
of powerholders’ allocations will be significant and positive in the compliant feedback condition 
(their allocations will become more self-interested over time), but not in the candid feedback 
condition, in which subordinate feedback will influence powerholders to keep their self-
interested inclinations in check. A panel data regression with time as the independent variable 
estimates the behavioral trends of powerholders’ allocations over time within the two different 
feedback conditions (candid versus compliant). Table 2 (Study 1) presents these regression 
results. The coefficient for time was positive and significant for powerholders in the compliant 
feedback condition (β = .16, p = .00) but non-significant for powerholders in the candid feedback 
condition. In other words, there was significant trend towards more self-interested allocations for 
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powerholders in the compliant feedback condition. Powerholders whose subordinates provide 
compliant feedback about how their allocation choices are perceived take an ever-larger 
proportion of the common resource over time. In contrast, powerholders whose subordinates 
provide candid feedback do not start along a slippery slope towards increasingly self-interested 
behavior (β = .06, ns) (see Figure 1, Study 1). 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Study 2 
In Study 1, we examined how subordinate feedback shapes powerholders’ allocation 
behavior on average and over time, depending on the type of feedback (Hypothesis 1-3). In 
Study 2, we positioned guilt as the mediating mechanism explaining the relationship between 
subordinate feedback and a powerholder’s allocation behavior (Hypothesis 4).  
Sample  
One hundred and eleven undergraduate students in an introductory organizational 
behavior class (72% female, Mage = 20.40 years, SD = 1.48) participated in the study in order to 
earn bonus marks (up to 4% added to their final grade). In this study, the bonus marks added to 
their final grade ranged from 0% to 4% (M = 2.13%, SD = 1.16%). 
Experimental Setting 
The procedure and the introduction of the experiment were the same as in Study 1, with 
one exception. As in Study 1, after powerholders made the initial endowment, subordinate 
feedback was received at the end of every round. However, in Study 2, immediately after 
powerholders received the subordinates’ feedback but before making their next allocation, they 
responded to additional questions about their feelings. During the debriefing, we checked 
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whether participants understood the dynamics of the game with the same two questions as in 
Study 1, and also probed them for suspicion. One participant failed to correctly answer questions 
designed to check whether they understood the game, and five participants reported suspicion 
that the subordinate feedback was fake. We excluded these participants from the analysis. 
Conditions. The experimental conditions were the same as in Study 1. We again included 
two conditions: candid feedback and compliant feedback.  
Measures and Operationalization 
Classification of powerholders’ allocation behavior. In order to simulate subordinate 
feedback, powerholders’ allocation behaviors were categorized in the same way as in Study 1.  
Subordinate feedback. As in Study 1, subordinates’ reactions to powerholders’ allocation 
decisions were computationally modeled and reported back to the powerholder as an average 
rating across all group members. 
Guilt. After making an allocation decision and receiving the feedback from subordinates 
but before proceeding to the next round, participants (i.e., powerholders) completed scales 
assessing their emotional state. Consistent with the measurement of guilt in previous research (e.g., 
Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2009; Ilies, Peng, Savani, & Dimotakis, 2013; Judge, Ilies, & Scott, 
2006), we assessed guilt using a subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule—
Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994). Although we only theorized about guilt as a 
mediating mechanism, in order to reduce demand characteristics, we also included one positive 
emotion (happiness), one basic emotion (self-assurance) and one affective state scale (surprise) in 
the set of items. We randomized the order of the items across rounds. Given that participants were 
going to be asked these items at the end of each round, to reduce participant fatigue we limited the 
items used to the three with the highest loadings for each subscale (Watson & Clark, 1994). 
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Participants thus responded to twelve adjective-based items (e.g. "I feel guilty after the previous 
round") on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Reliability for 
the guilt items was α = .76 at Round 1 and α = .78 at Round 10. 
Results 
First, consistent with Study 1, we ran a panel data regression, controlling for the first 
round allocation, and including a dummy variable for the feedback condition (compliant 
feedback = 0, candid feedback = 1). Replicating our results for Hypothesis 1 in our first study, 
there was a negative and significant coefficient for condition (β = -.32, p = .00), indicating that, 
on average, powerholders in the candid feedback condition took significantly less on average 
(Mcandid feedback = 43.12, SD = 27.99), than participants in the compliant feedback condition 
(Mcompliant feedback = 64.28, SD = 27.32). 
We replicated our results for Hypothesis 2 as well, such that in the candid feedback 
condition, subordinate feedback in one round predicted the size of the change in how self-
interested powerholders’ allocations were in the following round (β = .41, p = .00, see Table 1, 
Study 2). Similar to Study 1, after receiving negative feedback (or being rated as unfair), 
participants in this condition allocated themselves an amount close to an equal share, while after 
receiving positive feedback (or being rated as fair), participants allocated themselves almost half 
the total resources (Mnegative feedback = 32.46, SD = 18.98 vs. Mpositive feedback = 47.44, SD = 29.87, 
t(466) = 5.40, p = .00). We also replicated our results for Hypothesis 3, such that powerholders in 
the compliant feedback condition showed a positive and significant trend in their allocations, 
taking increasing amounts of the common resource over the course of the experiment (β = .24, p 
= .00, see Table 2, Study 2 and Figure 1, Study 2). 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that guilt mediates the relationship between subordinate feedback 
and the change in the powerholder’s next allocation (i.e., whether it becomes more or less self-
interested). We conducted a mediation analysis suitable to our multilevel panel data, following the 
procedure described by Krull and MacKinnon (1999, 2001). This multilevel mediation analysis 
computed both direct and indirect effects of subordinate feedback on the changes in powerholders’ 
subsequent allocation behavior. However, since this method only produces the effect sizes of the 
estimates (βa*βb), not standard errors or confidence intervals, we used an additional bootstrap 
procedure (with 1200 repetitions) to report standard errors (σβaβb) and the significance test results 
(z statistic). For the indirect effect of subordinate feedback on changes in allocation behavior 
through guilt, the analysis revealed an estimate of βa*βb = .0424 and a standard error (σβaβb) 
of .0108. The z statistic was significant (z = 3.93, p = .00). This result suggests that guilt was a 
significant mediator of the relationship between subordinate feedback and changes in 
powerholders’ allocation behavior. In other words, powerholders felt more (less) guilty when 
subordinate feedback was more (less) negative in response to their prior allocation decisions and 
subsequently took less (more) of the common resource. However, even in the presence of this 
significant indirect effect, the direct effect of subordinate feedback on changes in powerholders’ 
allocation behavior remained significant. The analysis revealed an estimate of βa*βb = .2167 and a 
standard error (σβaβb) of .0413 and a significant z statistic (z = 5.23, p = .00), suggesting that guilt 
only partially mediates this relationship.  
General Discussion 
Predicting when those with power will chose to serve their own or others’ interests is a 
topic of significant importance in social sciences (DeCelles et al., 2012; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; 
Overbeck & Park, 2006). The outcomes of these tradeoff decisions also have important 
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implications for employees (e.g., Maner & Mead, 2010), organizations (e.g., Zahra, Priem, & 
Rasheed, 2005) and wider stakeholders (e.g., Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Tosi, Katz, & 
Gomez-Meija, 1997). Although researchers have identified a number of individual and 
contextual factors that help explain when powerholders will make more or less self-interested 
decisions, the possibility that those affected by those decisions may, in turn, shape powerholders’ 
subsequent decisions has been largely neglected (Handgraaf et al., 2003). This is a crucial 
possibility, as it provides subordinates with some personal agency and control over how they are 
treated.  
In this paper, we examine how subordinates’ feedback to those with power over them 
reciprocally shapes the way powerholders later allocate resources to them. We examine these 
effects in the presence of subordinate feedback that is either candid or compliant. More 
importantly, our design allowed us to explore behavioral trends rather than only looking at 
average levels of powerholders’ allocation decisions. In two experiments, conducted in different 
countries, played for different stakes and with different samples (one community-based sample 
and one student sample), we showed that powerholders with subordinates who provide candid 
feedback about their prior allocation decisions behave very differently than those with 
subordinates who provide compliant feedback.  
Our results in both Study 1 and 2 suggest that powerholders who made allocations to 
subordinates who provided candid feedback about whether the powerholders’ prior allocation 
was self-interested behaved differently as a result of this feedback. When powerholders’ received 
candid feedback, their inclinations towards self-interest were held in check and the trend in their 
self-allocations remained flat over time. More specifically, candid feedback appears to trigger 
powerholders’ moral self-regulation, preventing them from going down a slippery slope (cf., 
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Gino & Bazerman, 2009) towards increasing self-interest. These findings suggest that providing 
candid feedback about a powerholder’s behavior is a good strategy if subordinates want to 
encourage powerholders to pay more attention to others’ needs. In contrast, powerholders in 
groups of subordinates who provided compliant feedback failed to regulate their behavior and 
simply became more self-interested in their allocation decisions over time.  
In addition, we examined whether guilt mediates the relationship between subordinates’ 
feedback and changes in powerholders’ allocation decisions. Our results provide evidence that, 
when they receive more negative feedback, powerholders feel more guilt and as a result they 
decrease the proportion of the common resource they take. In contrast, when they receive more 
positive feedback, they feel less guilt and take more of the common resource than they took 
previously. The fact that this relationship is mediated by guilt fits with findings in the moral 
emotion (Tangney et al., 2007) and moral self-regulation literatures (Monin & Jordan, 2009). 
Subordinate feedback triggers powerholders’ moral self-regulatory processes and determines 
their later behavior through the effect the feedback has on their affective state. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Our research has important theoretical implications for a number of research areas. First, 
this paper represents one of the few attempts to demonstrate how subordinates can affect 
powerholders’ allocation decisions, showing that subordinates can have an active influence on 
how they are ultimately treated. In this respect, these two experiments speak to prior research on 
power, particularly around whether power mitigates (Chen et al., 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Overbeck & Park, 2001) or intensifies (Keltner et al., 2003) powerholders’ self-interested 
tendencies. Our work advances this research by highlighting the role of an ever-present 
contextual factor for powerholders: the behavior of those over whom they hold power. More 
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importantly, we are able to show how subordinates can exercise agency in their ongoing 
relationship with people who hold power over them, rather than simply receive their outcomes in 
a passive way.  
Our work also represents one of the few efforts to examine powerholders’ behavior over 
time (e.g., Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir 2002). We relate literature on feedback and self-
regulation to the power literature to explore the behavioral trends of those with the power to 
allocate resources. In doing so, we show that powerholders use the feedback they receive from 
their subordinates in different ways depending on the type (or favorability) of the feedback (e.g., 
Smither & Walker, 2004). The results also suggest that subordinates are an important but 
neglected factor in powerholders’ moral self-regulation, providing them with moral credentials 
(in the case of both candid and compliant feedback) or triggering moral compensation (only in 
the case of candid feedback) (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Merritt et al., 2010). 
Existing work in the feedback literature reports inconsistent results regarding the effect of 
upward feedback on authorities (e.g., managers, supervisors, leaders) (Seifert et al., 2003; Seifert 
& Yukl, 2010). One of the main explanations for these inconsistent results is that recipients of 
feedback may find it less useful when it is from their subordinates, compared to their managers 
or peers (Bernardin, Dahmus, & Redmon, 1993). However, our theoretical focus on moral self-
regulation (Monin & Jordan, 2009) and our experimental design helps to enrich our current 
understanding regarding the behavioral reactions of recipients to feedback. In our study, negative 
feedback triggers guilt, which causes the powerholders who receive that feedback to adjust their 
subsequent allocation behavior in line with this affective reaction.  
 
 
Speaking Truth to Power      28 
	  
Practical Implications 
Practically speaking, our research shows that providing unquestioning, compliant 
feedback to powerholders will increase their self-interested behavioral tendencies over time. 
Subordinates aiming for more equitable collective outcomes are better served by speaking up 
rather than placidly accepting their powerholders’ decisions. Still, the question remains why a 
subordinate would speak up and challenge the powerholder, especially if the possibility of 
retribution exists. When powerholders react harshly or are unwelcoming towards subordinate 
feedback, subordinates tend to develop implicit assumptions that voice is harmful, which prevent 
them from expressing their concerns or challenging powerholders (Detert & Edmondson, 2011). 
Given our findings for the strong effects of feedback on powerholders’ later behavior, it seems 
important to build channels through which this information can flow more easily. This suggests 
that feedback from subordinates should perhaps be filtered through some sort of mediator (or 
facilitator) (e.g., Seifert et al., 2003) or be anonymous (e.g., Antonioni, 1994).  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
 The present study has several strengths. Longitudinal research on the reciprocal dynamic 
that powerholders and subordinates co-create is still emerging and lacks well-developed theories 
as well as strong empirical evidence. By conducting a controlled experimental study we are 
better able to unpack complicated processes about how powerholders can be influenced to 
become less self-interested over time. Our paradigm allowed us to build and test specific 
theoretical predictions about the effect of different types of feedback on trends in powerholder 
behaviors over time, while controlling for unmeasured variables.  
One of the important strengths of our experimental design was the fact that in our studies, 
a simple expression of subordinate perceptions shifted powerholders’ allocation decisions. This 
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is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the subordinates in our studies had no prior 
relationship with the powerholders, the powerholders were not dependent on them, and they 
would never know who the subordinates were. Hence, one might have expected our experimental 
manipulation to have no effect on how powerholders allocate resources at all. Nevertheless, 
participants were still influenced by those to whom they were making allocations, relinquishing 
allocations that affected their own ultimate payouts from the study in response to feedback. 
Despite its strengths, a number of limitations remain. One limitation is that we focused, in 
line with our theoretical framework, on only two specific types of subordinates, those that 
provided candid feedback and those that provided compliant feedback. We focused these two 
types because they represent the most obvious ways to respond to the decisions of those who 
have control over the resources one receives and because they are the most dominant subordinate 
types in the followership literature (e.g., Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010; 
Kelley, 1988). However, in the real world, individuals are more heterogeneous, and the processes 
we examine here likely play out in a noisier way. 
In addition, in our experimental design we did not manipulate any type of interdependence 
between powerholders and subordinates. Interdependence was minimal or nonexistent. However, 
had we done so one would expect an even stronger effect than our studies show. In fact, 
powerholders are dependent on their subordinates in many ways (Oc & Bashshur, 2013; 
Tjosvold, 1986) and have ongoing relationships (of different qualities) with them (Graen & Uhl-
bien, 1995). Thus, in the real world, powerholders are more obligated to take their subordinates’ 
interests into consideration given that the consequences for subordinate dissatisfaction may be 
severe. When subordinates perceive that their voice (or feedback) is not acknowledged or does 
not lead to change (i.e., the frustration effect, Folger, 1977), they can develop negative attitudes, 
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become less satisfied with outcomes, and show more dislike of authorities. Given our results, this 
suggests that real world subordinates have even more influence over powerholders than we 
demonstrate here.  
A potential weakness is that we used an equal division rule as the objective fairness 
criteria when manipulating subordinates’ reactions towards powerholders’ decisions. However, 
unequal allocations may not have seemed self-interested to our participants (powerholders) due 
to biased perceptions of their own behavior (e.g., underestimating of the level of their self-
interested behavior, feeling entitled). Indeed, the participants in our study generally took at least 
40% of the common resource. This mirrors results in other literatures that use the same paradigm. 
For example, De Cremer and his colleagues (2009) showed that simply being in a position of 
power inspired individuals to take more than an equal share of a common resource. Hence, it 
may be fruitful for future research to examine how different allocation rules (e.g., equity- or 
need-based) affect powerholders’ allocation decisions over time.  
In addition, our subordinates differed from one another only in terms of their fairness 
perceptions. Their influence on powerholders’ allocation behavior was a function of the guilt 
they triggered in the powerholder. However, there are a variety of other characteristics that 
distinguish subordinates and can make one more influential than another (Oc & Bashshur, 2013). 
For instance, some subordinates can exert greater power due to their status in the group (e.g., 
Eagly, 1983) or their relationship with the powerholder (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). 
Subordinate influence also increases as a function of powerholders’ dependence on them (Oc & 
Bashshur, 2013). As such, future research may benefit from considering other subordinate 
characteristics that moderate the effect of feedback on powerholders’ behavior. 
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All in all, we believe subordinate feedback is an important tool that can be used to align 
powerholders’ self-interest with the collective interests of others. Of course, the story is likely to 
be more complex than it appears. Powerholders may adjust their behavior and become less self-
interested when they receive candid feedback due not to some internalized belief that their 
actions were wrong, but more because they desire to been seen as fair (Dana et al., 2006) and 
earn credits in the eyes of subordinates (perhaps so they can spend them afterwards) (Hollander, 
1992). However, knowing the role that subordinate feedback can play in this process—the power 
they have to affect the moral self-regulation of those who have power over them—presents a first 
step in providing those who aren’t in the fortunate position of controlling the resources more say 
in their ultimate outcomes.  
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Table 1 
Panel Data Regressions on the Effect of Subordinate Feedback on Round-by-Round  
Changes in Powerholders’ Self-Allocations 
 Effect of prior round’s feedback on the change in 
powerholder’s allocation in the following round 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 Candid 
Feedback 
Compliant 
Feedback 
Candid 
Feedback 
Compliant 
Feedback 
Feedback(t-1) 7.87* -0.79 10.75* 5.30 
   SE 1.21 3.36 1.60 2.79 
   β .34* -.01 .41* .06 
     
R2 Overall 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.00 
Wald chi2 42.27 0.05 45.10 3.61 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.22 
# of observations 315 351 468 486 
# of powerholders (N) 35 39 52 54 
Note. “Feedback(t-1)” refers to the feedback given by subordinates in the previous  
round. SE refers to standard errors and β refers to the standardized coefficients.  
* p < .05. 
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Table 2 
Panel Data Regressions on the Effect of Subordinate Feedback on Powerholders’ Self-
Allocations over Time 
 Trend of the average amount of resources powerholders 
allocate to themselves, across the rounds of the experiment 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 Candid 
Feedback 
Compliant 
Feedback 
Candid 
Feedback 
Compliant 
Feedback 
Time 0.69 1.84* 0.54 2.23* 
   SE 0.36 0.31 0.30 0.28 
   β .06 .16* .06 .24* 
     
R2 Overall 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.06 
Wald chi2 3.63 34.72 3.21 62.01 
Prob > chi2 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 
# of observations 350 390 520 540 
# of powerholders (N) 35 39 52 54 
Note. “Time” refers to rounds in the experimental game. SE refers to standard errors  
and β refers to the standardized coefficients.  
* p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Individual powerholder self-allocations in the candid feedback and compliant feedback conditions, Studies 1 & 2 
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